It ain’t necessarily so: a legal realist perspective on the law of agency work by Paz-Fuchs, Amir
It ain’t necessarily so: a legal realist perspective on the law of 
agency work
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Paz-Fuchs, Amir (2020) It ain’t necessarily so: a legal realist perspective on the law of agency 
work. Modern Law Review, 83 (3). pp. 558-582. ISSN 0026-7961 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/88036/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
1 | P a g e  
 
It ain’t necessarily so:  
A Legal Realist perspective on the law of agency work 
Abstract 
Discussion and analysis of British employment and labour law is often characterised by a 
curious dissonance. The overarching narrative mandates that labour law is a countervailing 
force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power, embedded with values and assumptions 
concerning the nature of employment relations and regarding the role of labour law within 
these relations. And yet, labour law jurisprudence tends to treat with respect, seeks to decipher, 
abstract statutory concepts and tests derived from judicial pronouncements as if they were, 
indeed, a ‘brooding omnipresence in the sky’.  
This paper seeks to bridge that gap, by offering a legal realist account of the legal doctrine 
that governs the employment of agency workers, focusing on the ‘necessity’ and ‘sham’ tests. 
In doing so, it assesses the legitimacy of importing legal tests from one (commercial) context 
to another (employment) context; questions the courts’ protestations that their use is mandated 
by precedent; and outlines the real implications on the status and rights of agency workers in 
Britain.  
 
Keywords: labour law, agency workers, sham, necessity, legal realism. 
  
2 | P a g e  
 
Introduction  
Open-ended concepts are sometimes used in law as helpful guidelines in resolving legal 
problems, but they may also lead to troublesome consequences in real, social and economic, 
life. The use of two concepts - sham and necessity - in the context of agency work, serves as a 
case in point. This paper employs insights and tools from Legal Realism to question the courts’ 
methodology and conclusions, and to offer alternatives. 
Agency work holds a significant place in British labour market and in British labour law 
jurisprudence.1 In 2017, the Taylor Review estimated that the number of agency workers in the 
UK is between 800,000 and 1.2 million,2 a figure that, even at the bottom end, represents an 
increase of 30 per cent in five years.3 Other estimates suggest (based on a different 
methodology) that this watermark – of over a million agency workers – has been surpassed 
over a decade ago.4 A Resolution Foundation Report found that whilst the stereotype is that 
agency work is short and temporary, the number of permanent agency staff is ‘startling’. At 
times, years have passed, agencies were replaced, while the worker held her position and 
responsibilities throughout.  
The motivation for employing workers through agencies is clear: the use of personnel who 
are normally not unionised and do not have job security offers an employer a good degree of 
flexibility to suit production and service needs; for some, savings on employment costs are an 
important concern.5 To these, one may add that a political ideology that favours privatisation 
has led to regulatory requirements in the public sector that have mandated, over the past three 
decades, outsourcing of public services. We return to this aspect below. 
Looking abroad, workers employed by agencies approached the courts in many 
jurisdictions with a legal challenge: to ascertain whether the triangular relationship is 
‘authentic’ or ‘fictitious’. In the former case, the worker will be deemed employed by the 
                                                 
1 P. Elias, ‘Changes and Challenges to the Contract of Employment’ (2018) 38 OJLS 869, 880. 
2 M. Taylor, Good Work: The Taylor Review of Modern Employment Practices (London: Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2017) 24.  
3 L. Judge, Secret Agents: Agency Work in the New World of Work (London: Resolution Foundation, 2016) 17. 
4 E. McGaughey, ‘Should Agency Workers be Treated Differently?’ (LSE Working Papers 07/2010) 2. 
5 S. McKay, ‘Employer Motivations for Using Agency Labour: Hard Work, Hidden Lives: The Full 
Report of the TUC Commission on Vulnerable Employment’ (2008) Industrial Law Journal 296, 297.  
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agency.6 In the latter case, the court will unveil the ‘implied contract’ that the worker had with 
the end-user. In contrast, agency workers in Britain have a more formidable challenge, since 
they are routinely denied employment status, and consequently – denied statutory labour rights, 
with courts regularly asserting that the individuals involved are not employed by the agency 
nor by the end-user.7  
While the plight of agency workers has been subject to a wide range of criticisms, from 
courts through academia to media coverage, this paper sheds light on the mechanisms that have 
created a legal route to a dire result. In particular, it shows that the courts have developed two 
doctrines that have often proven almost insurmountable (the exceptions are few and far 
between) to the claims of agency workers. These are the test of necessity, and the sham 
doctrine. Questioning the applicability and legitimacy of these doctrines through the 
deployment of the legal realist paradigm, this paper seeks to ‘demystify’8 them and argues that, 
notwithstanding their protestations to the contrary, tribunals and courts had, and have, different 
options at their disposal, and their decision to deny agency workers employment status and 
rights is a controversial policy decision, rather than a necessary legal one.  
The legal predicament of agency workers in general, and the contribution of courts in their 
development of the two doctrines of sham and necessity, has been addressed by a number of 
labour law scholars over the past decade. Section 1 will thus offer a brief overview of the 
controversial construction of the courts, which will be contended in the subsequent analysis. 
Section 2 applies legal realist insights to this subject matter whilst, first, challenging the 
descriptive portrayal of the two doctrines (2A) and, then, by addressing the problematic 
                                                 
6 G. Davidov ‘Joint Employer Status in Triangular Employment Relations’ (2004) 42 British Journal of 
Industrial Relation 727. 
7 H. Collins ‘Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to Employment 
Protection Laws’ (1990) 10 OJLS 353; ACL Davies, EU Labour Law (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2012) 195; J. 
Prassl, The Concept of the Employer (Oxford: OUP, 2016) 87-90, 171; L. Barmes ‘Learning from Case 
Law Accounts of Marginalized Working’ in J. Fudge, S. McCrystal, K. Sankaran (eds), Challenging the 
Legal Boundaries of Work Regulation (Oxford: Hart, 2012) 303, 308; E. McGaughey, ‘Social Rights and 
the Function of Employing Entities’ (2017) 37 OJLS 482, 487; J. Riley, ‘The Definition of the 
Contract of Employment and its Differentiation from Other Contracts and Other Work Relations’ in 
M. Freedland et al (eds) The Contract of Employment 321, 335 (Oxford: OUP 2016).  
8 M. Fischl ‘Teaching Law as a Vocation: Local 1330, Promissory Estoppel, and the Critical Tradition in 
Labour Scholarship’ (2017) 33 International Journal of Comparative Labor Law and Industrial Relations 145, 
147. 
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implications of the courts’ approach (2B – Prescription) even beyond its effect on employment 
status and employment rights.  
A. Two elusive and distracting concepts: Sham and necessity in employment 
relationships 
One premise of this paper is that, nowithstanding its analytical and objective pretences, the law 
routinely relies on concepts and doctrines that are, in Felix Cohen’s memorable phrasing, ‘not 
defined either in terms of empirical fact or in terms of ethics but … are used to answer empirical 
and ethical questions alike, and thus bar the way to intelligent investigation of social fact and 
social policy’.9 Moreover, Cohen continues, legal reasoning based on those foundations is 
‘transcendental nonsense’, since it is ‘necessarily circular, since these terms are themselves 
creations of law’.10  
This paper focuses on the employment of two such concepts - sham and necessity - in the 
context of agency work. Both find their genesis in the commercial, rather than the employment, 
context. Whilst serving different objectives, the two concepts are closely related, acting to 
regulate tripartite relationships. A contract may be implied between the end-user and the 
worker where the contractual arrangements are a sham or when it is ‘necessary’ to do so. Each 
of the two concepts rests on a different end of the analysis. ‘Sham’ is designed to lift the veil 
over what were, ex ante, ‘agency arrangements which were never intended to reflect reality, 
but rather to obfuscate the true nature of the relationship’11; whereas the necessity test asks 
whether the relationship developed in such a manner that it is suitable, ex post, to imply an 
agreement between the end-user and the worker. Both concepts are familiar, and have been 
discussed quite extensively in labour law literature over the past decade, so a brief overview 
would suffice. 
1. Necessity 
The test of necessity was introduced to address the fact that, in a tripartite relationship, while 
the end-user acts as the individual’s employer in daily affairs, there is no explicit contract 
                                                 
9 F. Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’ (1944) 35 Columbia Law Review 809, 
820. 
10 ibid. 
11 James v London Borough of Greenwich [2008] EWCA Civ 35 [37]; National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v 
Wood [2007] EAT UKEAT/0432/07 [38]. 
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between the two. Instead, the two contracts that exist are those between the worker and the 
agency (which exacts little to no control over the worker, thus leaving ‘little room’ to find a 
contract of employment12) and between the agency and the end-user (for the terms according 
to which workers will be supplied).  
The contract between the agency and the worker routinely falters due to lack of control, 
and because of the inability to find mutuality of obligations,13 as it is often clear that the agency 
does not take upon itself to offer work on a regular basis.14 Insofar as the relationship between 
the end-user and the worker is concerned, the question is: can such a contract be implied? 
Curiously, it was only in 2004, after more than two decades of intense contracting out, that 
Dacas15 became the first occasion for the Court of Appeal (CoA) to confront ‘head on’ this 
question.16 Denying the claimant, Munby J reasoned that the ‘differential distribution’ of the 
employer between the agency and the end-user ‘has hitherto been relied on by the industry as 
necessarily producing the happy outcome — happy, that is, both for the agency and the end-
user, though not, of course, for the worker — that the worker has no contract of service either 
with the agency or with the end-user’.17  
The court then asked whether, and if so – when, one should imply a contract with the end-
user. Relying on the commercial case of The Aramis,18 the court found that, where a contract 
does not exist, it may be implied only when it is necessary to do so. And, in a series of cases, 
                                                 
12 Bunce v Postworth [2005] EWCA Civ 490 [29]. 
13 The latter is viewed by some to be the ‘key test’ – McGaughey, n 4 above, 16; M. Wynn and Patricia 
Leighton, ‘Agency Workers, Employment Rights and the Ebb and Flow of Freedom of Contract’ 
(2009) 72 MLR 91; also Brook Street Bureau (UK) Ltd v Dacas [2004] EWCA Civ 217. 
14 Montgomery v Johnson Underwood [2001] IRLR 269, 275. The use of the mutuality of obligations test to 
deny employment status is not, of course, without its critics. See, eg, M. Freedland, The Personal 
Employment Contract (Oxford: OUP 2003) 98-105; A.C.L. Davies, ‘The Contract for Intermittent 
Employment’ (2007) 36 Industrial Law Journal 102; E. Albin and J. Prassl ‘Fragmenting work, 
fragmented regulation: The contract of employment as a driver of social exclusion’ in The Contract of 
Employment, n 7 above, at 209, 219-222. But cf Elias n 1 at 881. 
15 Brook Street Bureau (UK) Ltd v Dacas [2004] EWCA Civ 217. 
16 As noted in James v Greenwich Council [2008] EWCA Civ 35 [47]. Earlier decisions of the EAT did discuss 
the possibility, however briefly. See eg Johnson Underwood v Montgomery [2001] EWCA Civ 318.  
17 Dacas n 15 above at [83]. See similarly the minority opinion in Johnson Underwood n 16 above at [50]: ‘the 
existence of mutuality has to be considered in the context that the issue whether Mrs Montgomery 
was an employee is to be linked to the particular job of work in respect of which payment was being 
made’ (emphasis in original) 
18 [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 213.  
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culminating in James v Greenwich Council,19 the courts clarified that this test is applicable not 
only in the commercial, but also in the employment, context. 
The facts pertaining to the necessity doctrine in James are instructive, and worth 
mentioning. Ms James provided support for unaccompanied under-18 asylum seekers on behalf 
of Greenwich council, through the Greenwich Social and Care Staff Agency. In doing so, 
however, the council continued to instruct her, set her work and working conditions, provide 
the materials and to organise the procedures. Ms James wore a council uniform, emblazoned 
with a council logo under her name. In 2004, she presented a claim for unfair dismissal. 
Accepting the EAT’s analysis, the CoA agreed that, when inquiring whether to imply a contract 
where one does not exist, the court will ask ‘whether it was necessary’20 to do so, as The Aramis 
instructs. As the Court recognises that the decision whether to imply a contract is ‘the real issue 
in the “agency worker” cases’,21 it is worth highlighting the precise content that the EAT 
breathed into the necessity test. Elias P explains that  
where the obligations taken by the parties can be explained wholly by 
reference to the express contracts which make up the agency arrangement, 
then ‘it is neither necessary nor appropriate to infer that there must be some 
other separate independent contractual obligation between the [worker] and 
the [end user]’.22 
This reasoning was accepted by the CoA.23 And so, the courts must inquire what the 
existing, relevant contracts dictate and to what extent they correspond with the reality of the 
situation. If there is no discrepancy, as in James, then a claim for a ‘necessary’, implied, 
                                                 
19 James n 16 above, following and elaborating on Brook Street Bureau (UK) Ltd v Dacas [2004] EWCA Civ 
217. Cable & Wireless Plc v Muscat [2006] EWCA Civ 220. 
20 James n 16 above at [23]. 
21 James n 16 above at [30] 
22 James n 16 above at [27], citing Munby J in Dacas n 11 above [35]; see also James [57]-[58] for an 
extended explanation of this position; and see a similar approach in Stephenson v Delphi Diesel System Ltd 
[2003] ICR 471. Also, in Muschett v Her Majesty Prison Services [2010] EWCA Civ 25 [18], stating that 
there is ‘no need to consider whether to imply a contract of employment between [Mr Muschett and 
HMPS]’ because the contractual terms in the case were clear and Mr Muschett worked in accordance 
with them; also Wynn and Leighton n 13 above at 315. 
23 James n 16 above at [42]: ‘What Ms James did and what the council did were fully explained in this case 
by the express contracts into which she and the council had entered with the employment agency’. 
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contract will fail.24 The mirror image of this picture can be found in two exceptional cases - 
National Grid25 and Harlow.26 In both cases, the contractual arrangements between the parties 
suggested a tripartite contract for services, while in reality the worker had a direct relationship 
with the client, who interviewed him, negotiated changes in pay, notice and holiday 
arrangements, and treated him ‘as though he were a wholly integrated member of staff’.27 In 
such a situation, where the worker was integrated within the end-user’s enterprise in a manner 
that was not consistent with the contracts, the EAT found it necessary to imply a contract 
between the end-user and the worker. These cases suggested, for a short while, that the 
implication of a contract between the end-user and the worker could be quite commonplace.28 
However, subsequent cases ‘witnessed a dynamic of retrenchment on the part of the 
judiciary’.29  
A notable shift in that direction, which arguably precludes optimism regarding the future 
implication of a contract of employment, is found in decisions delivered by the CoA in Tilson30 
and then in Smith v Carillion.31 In these cases, the claimant’s argument to protection from 
unfair dismissal (Tilson); or for undertaking trade union activities, including health and safety 
duties in the construction industry (Smith),32 was undermined by the fact that he was an agency 
worker. In many respects, the claimant’s situation in both cases was similar to those in National 
Grid and in Harlow: he was interviewed by the client; received safety instruction from the 
client; was provided with an office there; reported and was subject to discipline by the client’s 
managerial team; represented the client in meetings and signed documents on his behalf. 
However, these terms of engagement were not dictated by, or even supported by, the relevant 
contracts. And yet, the CoA found that ‘it is not unusual for an agency worker to be integrated 
into the business of the end user; and where the work is of a managerial nature, the worker will 
                                                 
24 East Living v Sridhar [2008]; F. Reynold, ‘The Status of Agency Workers: A Question of Legal Principle’ 
(2006) 35 Industrial Law Journal 320; E. Brown, ‘Protecting Agency Workers: Implied Contract or 
Legislation?’ (2008) 37 Industrial Law Journal 178.  
25 National Grid n 11 above at [40]; note that a similar dicta is found in Protectacoat Firthglow Ltd v Szilagyi 
[2009] EWCA Civ 98 [55], with no reference to a ‘necessity’ requirement.  
26 UKEAT 0144-07-2106 Harlow District Council v O’Mahony & Anor [2007]. 
27 National Grid n 11 above at [40]. 
28 M. Wynn, ‘End of the Line for Temps’ (2009) 158 New Law Journal 352. 
29 D. Cabrelli, Employment Law in Context (3rd ed, Oxford: OUP, 2018) 128.  
30 Tilson v Alstom Transport [2010] EWCA Civ 1308. 
31 Smith v Carillion (JM) Ltd & Anor [2015] EWCA Civ 209. 
32 Pursuant to the Employment Rights Act 1996, s 146. 
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have to fit into the management team’.33 Should the Smith interpretation of the necessity test 
prevail,34 it is difficult to see how a claim to imply a contract may succeed.  
What we see here, in Smith and Tilson, is the court supplementing the necessity test, which 
it already acknowledged to be a ‘difficult hurdle’,35 with yet another one. An indication of the 
supplementary legal principle to which the Smith court is referring may be found in its summary 
of the ‘established’ legal principles pertaining to agency work. There, hidden in the concise 
overview of the principles laid down, inter alia, in James and Dacas, Elias LJ includes an 
additional layer: after explaining that the necessity test may be met when the contractual 
arrangements do not reflect the true arrangements, he adds that ‘it may also be simply because 
the relationship alters over time and can no longer be explained by the dual agency contracts 
alone’.36 The court, it should be clear, made no effort to show how, in this particular case, the 
relationship had ‘altered’ over time, i.e. that it started out as a bona-fide agency relationship 
but transformed into something else. Quite the contrary, the overview of the facts in the case 
suggest that the relationship was consistent and stable from the start. Additionally, it is worth 
noting that whilst ‘the mere passage of time’ is repeatedly noted as insufficient to justify the 
implication of a contract on necessity grounds,37 we find here that it may work to explain away 
the need to imply a contract where otherwise the necessity test would have been satisfied. In 
other words, the criteria for satisfying the necessity test have changed, to the detriment of 
workers. This is a crucial point, because a central argument for Legal Realism is that these 
concepts are more fluid and malleable than they are usually presented. As they are subject to 
incremental or significant interpretations and can absorb different content, these (interpretation 
and content) should arguably, insofar as possible, advance just social, economic and political 
aims, rather than distance the law from such aims.   
2. Sham 
As noted, like the necessity requirement, the ‘sham doctrine’ was first developed in a 
commercial context. In Snook,38 Diplock LJ stated that, for the court to view a transaction as a 
sham, two conditions must apply. First, the appearance of the parties’ legal rights and 
                                                 
33 Smith n 31 above at [35]; similarly Tilson n 30 above at [22]. 
34 See recently Heynike v 00222648 Ltd (formerly Birlec Ltd) [2018] EWHC 303 (QB). 
35 Smith n 31 above at [28]. 
36 Smith n 31 above at [21]. 
37 James n 16 above at [31]; Smith n 31 above at [21]. 
38 Snook v London and West Riding Investment Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 518.  
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obligations must be different from the actual rights and obligations. And, second, ‘all the parties 
thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the legal 
rights and obligations which they give the appearance of creating’.39 This construction 
governed the unfortunate path of sham interpretation in the British employment context. In 
several early, formative cases, both sides were content with the construction they had devised, 
which categorised the labourer as self-employed. It was a third party, namely – the British 
public, which was denied due taxes and national insurance contributions.40 This social and 
economic context was a driving force when MacNeil J wrote: ‘The parties to a contract of 
employment cannot, by private arrangement, exclude from the arrangement public or 
community obligations’.41  
On occasion, British courts were willing to expand the notion of sham beyond this narrow 
construction, and to embrace a broader notion of ‘contractual sham’. In such cases, the 
employer is seen to have adopted the relevant legal tests for employee status, as set by the 
courts, in a cynical way by inserting them verbatim into the contract so as to deprive employees 
of statutory rights.42 For example, if the courts characterised employment as a personal 
relationship, the employer will simply insert a ‘substitution clause’ into the contract, formally 
empowering the worker to send a substitute to perform the work, even when it is clear to both 
parties that such a situation will never occur.43 In response, courts, encouraged by legal 
scholars,44 have become quite aware of the absolute ease of inserting ‘elaborate protestations’ 
to a contract to deny workers their rights, even ‘when examined, [they] bore no practical 
relation to the reality of the relationship’.45 Thus, the CoA in Szilagyi noted that ‘To speak of 
terms “solemnly agreed in writing” is more redolent of commercial agreement reached between 
two parties of equal bargaining power than the kind of “take it or leave it” situation which can 
prevail in some agreements in the field of work’.  
                                                 
39 ibid 803 (emphasis added). 
40 See, e.g., Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd. v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 1 All 
E.R. 433; Warner Holidays Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Social Services [1983] ICR 440.  
41 Warner n 40 above at 454. 
42 Simon Deakin ‘The Changing Concept of the ‘Employer’ in Labour Law’ (2001) 30 Industrial Law 
Journal 72, 75; Elias n 1 above at 871, 884. 
43 A.C.L. Davies ‘Sensible Thinking About Sham Transactions’ (2009) 38 Industrial Law Journal 318, 323; cf 
Express and Echo Publications v Tanton [1999] ICR, CA. 
44 See e.g. B. Hepple, ‘Restructuring Employment Rights’ (1986) 15 Industrial Law Journal 69. 
45 Sedley LJ in Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2009] EWCA Civ 1046 [41]. 
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However, the dominance of the Snook doctrine has kept the ‘radical mainstream’46 
approach at bay for several decades insofar as a triangular employment relationship is 
concerned. As late as 2008, in Kalwak, the CoA echoed Diplock LJ’s approach and overturned 
Elias P’s ruling in the EAT, explaining that ‘a finding that the contract was in part a sham 
required a finding that both parties intended it to paint in that respect a false picture as to the 
true nature of their respective obligations’.47 In a scorching critique of the decision, Lizzie 
Barmes notes that, to require collusion between an agency and agencies workers such as Ms 
Kalwak – a migrant from a poorer country who barely speaks English, with no access to legal 
advice – as a pre-condition, would essentially mean that ‘the law would never recognise that 
agreement in situations like the one before the court were a sham’.48 
It was only in 2011 that the Supreme Court’s Autoclenz49 decision expanded the concept 
of sham in the employment context. There, the Court instructed tribunals to focus on the ‘reality 
of the situation’ and the ‘actual obligations of the parties’, as derived from their true 
expectations and conduct, and to assess whether those differ from the contractual 
‘protestations’. The instruction would thus be that ‘when employers draft contracts that do not 
represent the real nature of the relationship, courts must ignore such sham appearances and ask 
whether the characteristics that justify protection appear in the real life arrangements’.50  
The focus of this approach, we find, is on the discrepancy between the contractual 
arrangement and the true employment relationship. While clearly expanding the Snook 
definition of sham beyond its original breadth, it is worth noting its limits in the present context. 
First, whilst the background facts in Autoclenz include an intermediary party, the SC ignored 
that aspect completely, and treated it as a standard, bilateral employment relationship. This is 
probably the case because the claimants’ argument focused on the existence of a contract 
between the worker and the agency, whereas the contentious aspect in many agency work cases 
concerns the ability to imply a contract between the worker and end user. Indeed, a few years 
later, Elias LJ’s premise seemed to be that Autoclenz required no ‘departure from established 
                                                 
46 A. Bogg ‘Sham Self-Employment in the Court of Appeal’ (2010) 126 Law Quarterly Review 166, 171. 
47 Consistent Group v Kalwak [2008] IRLR 505 [28]. 
48 Barmes n 7 above at 319-320. 
49 Autoclenz Limited v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41. 
50 G. Davidov ‘Re-Matching Labour Laws with their Purpose’ in G. Davidov and B. Langille (eds), The 
Idea of Labour Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 179. 
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jurisprudence regarding agency workers’.51 Second, and more substantively, even the broader, 
Autoclenz rationale is not very remote from the content already given to the concept of sham 
in the agency context. This is because, as noted in the discussion concerning the necessity test 
- the courts assessed precisely this matter, to wit: whether the relevant contracts reflect reality. 
As Patrick Elias recently noted: ‘Autoclenz allows a court to deal with the cases where the 
agreement is a sham, but the problems arise when it genuinely reflects the way in which the 
contract is performed’.52 
Moreover, as we see below, Autoclenz does not alter the premise that the employer’s 
intentions, which led it to construct a roundabout structure to employ an individual, are 
immaterial, even if, for example, they ‘adopt arrangements whose sole or principal purpose is 
to avoid the application of protective legislation’.53  
B. What’s wrong with this Picture? Wrong in its description, wrong in its 
prescription 
1. Description 
i. Doctrinal Indeterminacy 
One of the fundamental insights of Legal Realism is that of doctrinal indeterminacy, the idea 
that the ‘there is less possibility of accurate prediction of what courts will do than the traditional 
rules would lead us to suppose’.54 Moreover, it is ‘[b]y falsely presenting (often intuitive) value 
judgments made by judges as inevitable entailments of predetermined rules and concepts, [that] 
formalism obscures these choices’.55 
In the present case, we may ask: were the courts forced to rely on the existing doctrines 
for, respectively, positing necessity as a precondition for the implication of a contract and 
setting a high bar for the assertion of a contract as a sham? In the present case, we need not 
look far to show why such an argument cannot hold. In the very context of the interpretation 
of the sham doctrine, the Supreme Court, first in Gisda56 and then more explicitly in 
                                                 
51 Smith n 31 above at [30]. 
52 Elias n 1 above at 884 (emphasis added).  
53 S. Deakin ‘The Changing Concept of the ‘Employer’ in Labour Law’ (2001) 30 Industrial Law Journal 72. 
54 Llewellyn n 81 above at 1241; F. Schauer, ‘Legal Realism Untamed’ (2013) 91 Texas Law Review 749, 
752; H. Dagan, Reconstructing American Legal Realism and Rethinking Private Law Theory (Oxford: OUP, 
2013) 18-24. 
55 Dagan n 54 above at 22; F. Schauer, ‘Formalism’ (1988) 97 Yale Law Journal 509, 511.  
56 Gisda Cyf v Barratt [2010] UKSC 41 [37], [39] 
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Autoclenz,57 offered a contextual approach where bilateral (as opposed to trilateral, including 
agency) employment relationships are concerned. Taking into account the different bargaining 
position of parties to an employment relationship, the Supreme Court unanimously accepted a 
‘critical difference’58 between commercial contracts and personal employment contracts. 
Instead, it endorsed the advice of the Court of Appeal in Autoclenz, namely: that ‘in this area 
of the law… a court or tribunal … have to investigate allegations that the written contract does 
not represent the actual terms agreed and the court or tribunal must be realistic and worldly 
wise when it does so’.59 
We find here an interesting lesson to be learned here regarding the formalist account of the 
venerable power of stare decisis. The 40 year old importation of the Snook interpretation of the 
sham doctrine to employment law is suddenly a thing of the past. How could that be the case? 
For Legal Realists, there is little here about which to be surprised, as courts rarely engage in an 
‘impartial application of determinate existing rules’. Instead, they explain, ‘doctrine qua 
doctrine is radically indeterminate’60 in at least two senses.  
First, where the law is not settled, the tribunal or court has considerable discretion, because 
of the multiplicity of sources that are available. Mark Freedland, whose work would not 
necessarily align with Legal Realism wholesale, recently wrote that the ‘conspicuously wide 
range of norms’ which serve as sources for the structural principles governing the contract of 
employment ‘confer[] upon the judges … an extensive latitude of choice as to the sources upon 
which they may draw’.61 The decision to view a legal precedent as applicable (or not) is not an 
exercise in logic, but rather a political one, in the broad sense of the term. Since legal norms 
are ‘in the habit of hunting in pairs’,62 and since ‘for every legal principle there exist[s] a 
potential counter-principle’,63 a court may prefer a statute to a case that is putatively ‘on point’; 
                                                 
57 Autoclenz n 49 above. 
58 ibid [34]-[35]; and again in Braganza v BP Shipping [2015] UKSC 17 (Lady Hale, noting that the 
employment contract ‘is of a different character from an ordinary commercial contract’).  
59 Aikens LJ in Autoclenz CA n 45 above. The notion was re-emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Uber v 
Aslam [2018] EWCA Civ 2748 [49]. 
60 H. Dagan, ‘Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism and the Rule of Law’ (2015) 163 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1889, 1891. 
61 M. Freedland ‘The Legal Structure of the Contract of Employment’ in The Contract of Employment n 6 
above at 28, 35. 
62 W.W. Cook, Book Review, (1929) 38 Yale Law Journal 405, 406 (reviewing B. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of 
Legal Science (1928)). 
63 G.E. White ‘The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies’ (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 649, 651. 
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may view two previous cases as inherently conflicting (thus giving significant leeway to 
choose) or as reconcilable;64 may take inspiration from other jurisdictions or view them as 
irrelevant, and so on examples abound. Moreover, the court may be influenced by ‘nonlegal’ 
(in the traditional sense) material, ‘whose existence and application are variable and 
manipulable’.65 This does not mean that the ‘idiosyncratic’ version of Legal Realism – which 
would suggest that law is nothing but ‘a product of judicial bellyaches’66 – should prevail. 
Indeed, we would not be able to discuss coherently the doctrine relating to agency work if the 
concept of legal doctrine were meaningless. Instead, Realists recognise the ‘interpretative 
leeway’67 and discretion that judges have when required to deal with a new challenge. Frederick 
Schauer convincingly argues that this understanding of ‘indeterminacy’ should actually receive 
a different title, such as ‘dislocated determinacy’,68 thus reflecting the true breadth of power at 
the hands of judges, and the limited authority of paper rules in certain situations.  
Closely related to our field of enquiry, we note that The Aramis and Snook doctrines 
are not as stable and consistent, even within the commercial context, as the courts portrayed 
them to be. Thus, with regards to necessity, Brodie has observed that the Aramis itself was ‘a 
departure from orthodoxy’ as it is ‘inconsistent with a well-established body of case law which 
recognizes performance as a conventional mode of acceptance’.69 As he (and others70) have 
explained, the implication of a term and, arguably, of a contract, could be decided on a less 
stringent test than that of ‘necessity’.71  
And as for sham, we need only refer to Lord Clarke’s speech in Autoclenz, in which he 
notes that in the context of landlord and tenant, and housing in general, the courts have 
                                                 
64 For a closely related example see A. Bogg, ‘Sham Self Employment in the Supreme Court’ (2012) 41 
Industrial Law Journal 328, 329 noting how the Court of Appeal in Szilagyi n 25 above ‘sought to 
downplay the differences between the EAT and Court of Appeal in Kalwak describing these as, in 
effect, differences of expression rather than differences of substance’.  
65 Schauer, n 54 above, 752. 
66 Cohen, n 9 above, 843. 
67 Dagan, n 60 above, 1903; K. Llewellyn, ‘The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of 
Juristic Method’ (1940) 49 Yale Law Journal 1355, 1385. 
68 Schauer, n 65 above, 769, 776. 
69 Douglas Brodie, ‘The Autonomy of the Common Law of the Contract of Employment from the 
General Law of Contract’ in The Contract of Employment, n 6 above, 124, 132-133. 
70 McGaughey, n 4 above, 29. 
71 Baird Textile Holdings v Marks and Spencer plc [2001] EWCA Civ 274; Equitable Life Assurance Society v 
Hyman [2002] 1 AC 408; also Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10, [23] and 
Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72, [23]. 
14 | P a g e  
 
repeatedly disregarded false arrangements even beyond the Snook scenario.72 And, as 
mentioned earlier, the CoA in Szilagyi73 and the EAT in Kalwak74 sought to broaden the 
approach, prior to Autoclenz. On appeal, however, the CoA in Kalwak chose to reinstate the 
narrow, Snook, approach, noting that ‘to any lawyer the word “sham” in relation to a contractual 
document has the Snook meaning and the Chairman did not suggest he was using it in a 
different sense (if there is one)’.75  
A Realist approach would be unambiguous on this matter: clearly there is a different sense 
of sham (as indeed the SC later decided in Autoclenz). The court’s effort to seemingly close 
down other interpretative avenues (‘if there is one’), was of the category lucidly criticised by 
Atleson: ‘the courts’ use of “of course” rationales tell us where the ghosts are buried … the 
ghosts will be certain values and presumptions about the role of management and the place of 
employees deemed to be inherent in our industrial society’.76 In doing so, formalism ‘bars the 
way to an open inquiry of the normative desirability of alternative judicial decisions, thus 
unduly essentializing contingent doctrinal choices’.77 
A second sense of indeterminacy relates to the fact that courts may decide to move away 
from past precedents, even when the law is ‘settled’. Even the grandees of Legal Realism, such 
as Cohen and Llewelyn, agreed that, on many occasions, judges are influenced by, and apply, 
rules that they view as reasonable, relevant and efficient.78 Indeed, some Realists argue that 
judges deviate from set rules only in moments of ‘paradigm shift’79 which cannot be too 
frequent, else they risk endangering the sense of stability, and with it the sense of legitimacy, 
that (even) Realists acknowledge are important. The courts’ reasons for adhering to existing 
doctrine notwithstanding, they clearly have the power to deviate from it, when they choose to 
do so. Thus, one need not necessarily agree with Robinson’s quip that adherence to precedent 
is solely ‘a habit of mind in which a stupidity may be perpetuated on the grounds that it is well-
                                                 
72 Autoclenz n 49 above at [23] 
73 Szilagyi n 25 above at [15] 
74 Kalwak n 47 above at [57]. 
75 Kalwak n 47 above at [38] (emphasis added).  
76 J. Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1983) 91; similarly Cohen, n 9 above, 810-812; Fischl, n 8 above, 155-156.  
77 Dagan, n 54 above, 23; Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘Law in Science and Science in Law’ in Learned Hand 
(ed) Collected Legal Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1921) 210, 230, 232, 238-239.  
78 Cohen, n 9 above, 840; K. Llewellyn, ‘A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step’ (1930) 30 Columbia 
Law Review 431, 444.  
79 Dagan, n 60 above, 1905. 
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established’;80 and still acknowledge that courts have significant discretion and capacity to 
develop the law.  
The approach to precedent, then, is far more fluid than is often presented, and may be used 
as ‘a way of change as well as a way of refusing to change’ existing doctrine.81 The judicial 
vision of the employment relationship, after all, has changed over time, at times because of a 
different ideological, or policy based, paradigm.82 We find here, then, evidence to the 
fundamental insight of the Realist approach to judicial discretion: though not absolute (as the 
caricature of realism may suggest) it is far wider than what is suggested by the linguistic 
boundaries between the ‘core’ and ‘penumbra’ of a concept.83 
ii. Realist Categories 
Beyond the general insight concerning judicial discretion and doctrinal indeterminacy, 
Legal Realists argue that the law should be context-sensitive. While this insight may seem 
innocuous (and perhaps obvious), it differs significantly from the formalist analysis. While 
taxonomy and classification are integral to legal formalism,84 these usually refer to categories 
such as contract, tort, equity; or rights, rules, and remedies and so on.85 In contrast, a transition 
of a doctrine from one century to another, or from one context to another, is not only legitimate, 
but serves to buttress the (formalist) myth of coherence and consistency.86 Legal Realists 
recognise the importance of categories and classification, but have a very different approach to 
both. Realists recognise that thought cannot ‘go on without categories … to classify is to 
disturb’.87 But they assert that classifications are not part of an objective truth; rather, they are 
a social construct that should serve a purpose. Moreover, they argue, classifications should not 
be held as true simply because they solidified with time. Rather, they should be consistently 
                                                 
80 E. Robinson, ‘Law – an Unscientific Science’ (1934) 44 Yale Law Journal 235, 256. 
81 K. Llewellyn, ‘Some Realism About Realism: Responding to Dean Pound’ (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 
1222, 1253.  
82 Freedland, n 61 above, 35-36; Brodie, n 69 above, 130; and for an example concerning the development 
of assumptions concerning the expected length of a contract of employment (‘the annual hiring rule’) 
see N. Countouris, ‘The Contract of Employment as an Expression of Continuing Obligations’ in The 
Contract of Employment, n 6 above, 362, 365-369. 
83 Cf H.L.A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593, 
607-608; and see the discussion in Schauer, n 54 above. 
84 P. Birks, English Private Law (Oxford: OUP, 2000). 
85 S. Smith, ‘Taking Law Seriously’ (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 241, 246. 
86 W. Twining, ‘Other People’s Power: The Bad Man and English Positivism, 1897-1997’ (1997) 63 
Brooklyn Law Review 189, 198. 
87 Llewellyn, n 73 above. 
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challenged.88 Legal categories should be based on values and social context, which would 
differentiate ‘consumer law’ from ‘labour law’, for example. They should be less concerned, 
in contrast, with doctrinal legal taxonomy, which may cut across these areas.89 Doing so would 
tailor legal categories narrowly to achieve the ‘particularity and minuteness in the classification 
of human transactions for legal treatment’, remedying the ‘orgy of overgeneralisation’.90 Dagan 
explains that ‘our lives are divided into economically and socially differentiated segments and 
each such “transaction of life” has some features that are of sufficient normative importance, 
which … justif[y] a distinct legal treatment’.91 Later, with Michael Heller, he argues for a 
taxonomy that includes ‘a wide spectrum of contract types, ranging all the way from purely 
instrumental deals with strangers … to thick communitarian contract types’.92  
 In this case, the categories of the commercial contract should be understood to be 
significantly distinct from the employment contract. While the former often involves two 
professional, informed parties of similar expertise engaged in a one-off transaction, the latter 
often involves a party who is far less informed of the legal implication, who has no access to 
legal advice, and who enters a relationship that is set for years to come.93 The argument would 
be, therefore, that the values underpinning the law itself (rather than an external critique 
regarding its political biases94) should reject the quick application of the commercial use of 
necessity and sham doctrines to the employment realm. Not only are the relationships 
exemplified in each realm of a different nature, but the values that the law seeks to advance in 
each are correspondingly distinct. Forcing a ‘unified’ approach to ‘contract’ in the abstract, 
without due regard to the critical differences in categories, risks undermining the unique and 
valuable social relationships in one (or more) of the relevant realms.  
                                                 
88 Id. 
89 G. Samuel, ‘English Private Law: Old and New Thinking in the Taxonomy Debate’ (2004) 24 OJLS 
335, 341. 
90 H. Oliphant, ‘A Return to Stare Decisis’ (1928) 14 American Bar Association Journal 71, 73-74. 
91 Dagan, n 54 above, 57. 
92 Dagan and Heller, The Choice Theory of Contracts (Cambridge: CUP 2017) 72; S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, 
‘Labour Law and Economic Theory: A Reappraisal’ in H. Collins, P. Davies and R. Rideout (eds), 
Legal Regulation of the Employment Relations (Kluwer 2000) 45. And see similarly H. Collins, Regulating 
Contracts (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 181.  
93 Prassl, n 7 above, 173; Prassl and Albin, ‘Employees, Employers and Beyond’ in The Contract of 
Employment, n 7 above, 341, 355-356. 
94 See M. Freedland ‘General Introduction—Aims, Rationale and Methodology’ in The Contract of 
Employment, n 7 above, 3, 23. 
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A side note may be of interest, at this stage. Notwithstanding the above, one should be 
wary of oversimplifying the breadth and implications of this insight. A troubling complexity is 
inherent in the approach that theory should follow categories because, at times, the theory is 
needed to determine which category should be applied. Such is the case, for example, when 
seeking to determine whether an individual is self-employed or a worker/employee. If she is 
self-employed, then a commercial approach to, say, the sham doctrine, would be perfectly 
legitimate. But if she is an employee, then we should prefer the broader, Autoclenz approach, 
which is more appropriate for the employment context. And yet, the very question that is laid 
before us is whether this is a commercial or an employment law context. In such cases, we have 
a Munchausen issue of the theory lifting itself by its own pigtail (and not, as is commonly 
perceived, by its bootstraps). This issue seems to have been noted, in passing, by Underhill LJ 
in Uber where, unlike the majority, he saw the respondent as entitled to rely on the commercial 
case of Secret Hotels2 because the case may be ‘a consumer contract and not in the employment 
field at all’.95 Happily for us, however, as there is no assertion that agency work scenarios do 
not belong within the employment sphere, this conundrum may be postponed for a later date.  
iii. Law v Policy 
Famously, mainstream legal reasoning seeks to emulate the sciences in its logical and rational 
approach, deploying tools of classification, induction and deduction. We may have to credit 
William Blackstone or Edward Coke as two forebearers of this approach, but contemporary 
legal philosophers, such as Ronald Dworkin, who would reject the positivist mantel, assume a 
similar mindset, in this respect.96 In particular, I refer to the delineation between law and policy. 
According to this formalist paradigm, law is effective in offering practical guidance because it 
‘carries out its guidance function by limiting its domain of reasons’.97  
This approach is highly apparent in the present context. Thus, reflecting on the effect that 
the decisions in James and Cable and Wireless had on legal certainty for the industry, Michael 
Wynn argues that it will now ‘be able to contract on firmer grounds of existing legal principle 
rather than the shifting sands of policy extension’.98 Similarly, David Cabrelli suggests that by 
                                                 
95 Uber n 59 above at [153]. 
96 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Oxford: Hart, 1986).  
97 L. Alexander and F. Schauer, ‘Is Policy Within Law’s Limited Domain’ (2007) 26 Queensland Law Journal 
221, 225. 
98 Wynn, n 28 above. 
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adopting the strict test for necessity, ‘the Court of Appeal acknowledged that orthodox legal 
doctrine such as contractual intention and freedom of contract ought to be afforded priority 
over policy considerations’. In contrast, he suggests, the Dacas decision was ‘clearly motivated 
by policy considerations … at the expense of doctrinal coherence’ and that the response 
reflected uneasiness ‘about the sacrifice of legal principle at the altar of policy’.99 Moreover, 
whilst recognising the predicament that the ‘legal principle’ posits for agency workers, Robert 
Davies reverts to the age old, positivist division of labour: legal principles are for the judiciary, 
whereas policy initiatives ‘are more appropriately to be a function of Parliament’.100 
The judiciary has been happy to repeat this mantra. Thus, the Court in James sought to 
address the ‘unrealistic expectations’ that ‘some litigants and their advisers and representatives 
appear to have about what courts and tribunals can legitimately do to remedy their grievance’ 
in an extraordinary Postscript of the decision, part of which is worth reciting: 
Through their decisions adjudicating on legal disputes courts and tribunals 
are builders in the law. They are not architects of economic and social 
policy... As they must operate within the legal architecture created by others, 
they cannot confer the right not to be unfairly dismissed on a worker who is 
without a contract of employment.101 
More recently, in the gig economy case of Uber, Underhill LJ wrote, in his minority 
opinion, that ‘[p]rotecting against abuses of inequality of bargaining power is the role of 
legislation’, and not of the courts.102 And Elias LJ, writing extra-judicially, recognises the 
serious problems relating to the status and rights of agency workers and workers on zero hours 
contracts, but asks ‘to what extent the problems are caused by the judiciary, and whether they 
could and should have developed the common law so as to frustrate these developments’.103 
He subsequently suggests that ‘Judges are applying contract law’, and it does not mean that 
‘because there is a problem, the judges can fashion the solution’.104 
                                                 
99 Cabrelli, n 29 above, 128-129. 
100 R. Davies, ‘Contracting out and the Retention of the Employment Model in the NHS’ (2004) 33 
Industrial Law Journal 95, 115; also Wynn, n 28 above. 
101 James n 16 above at [56]. A similar apologia was offered by the court in Bunce n 12 above at [32]. 
102 Uber n 59 above at [147] 
103 Elias, n 1 above, 880. 
104 Elias, n 1 above, 885-886. 
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Such false modesty concerning the role of the judiciary is embedded in legal formalism,105 
and has a clear purpose. In embracing this approach, the courts shield themselves from 
ideological, political, social and economic criticism.106 If courts simply implement decisions 
dictated by others, one cannot fault them for the effects of those decisions. Of course, Legal 
Realists reject this distinction between law and policy wholesale, and the division of labour 
between courts and legislatures that derives from it.107 Llewellyn explains that the doctrinal 
indeterminacy, noted above, leaves judges with a choice between equally authoritative options, 
and that choice ‘can be justified only as a question of policy’.108 And Schauer clarifies that a 
judge may depart from an immediately applicable ‘paper rule’ on the basis of her perception 
of ‘justice, policy or the equities of a particular controversy’.109 Some have gone further, 
suggesting that, as the victims of the doctrine are often those who are less well-off, traditional 
legal discourse operates in a sinister way, as ‘economic prejudice masquerading in the cloak of 
legal logic … to perpetuate class prejudices and uncritical assumptions which could not survive 
the sunlight of free ethical controversy’.110 
It should be made clear that it is not only explicit, political, ‘progressive’ or ‘conservative’ 
policy that qualify within the Realist mindset. Rather, Legal Realists would claim that courts 
‘do (legal) policy’ and thus – embrace values (and reject others) as a matter of course.111 In the 
instant case, for example, Realists would thus suggest that courts do policy when they embrace 
‘freedom of contract’ in a highly particularised and narrow manner whilst relying on 
‘independence and formal equality [as] the only legitimate commitments of the law, tout 
court’.112 One may continue to argue that other legal approaches are possible, and these may 
include the acknowledgment of inequality of bargaining power and the importance of securing 
substantive equality and/through workers’ rights. Both are respectable values, and the choice 
of one over the other is nothing other than a choice of legal policy. Indeed, the fashionable 
‘purposive interpretation’ approach, which is having noticeable impact in labour law 
                                                 
105 Freedland, n 61 above, 36. 
106 Schauer, n 55 above, 510; Dagan, n 54 above, 16, 22, 33. 
107 J. Bell, Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (Oxford: OUP, 1983) 227.  
108 Llewellyn, n 81 above, 1252.  
109 Schauer, n 54 above, 776 fn 113. 
110 Cohen, n 9 above, 817, 840. 
111 K. Klare ‘Horizons of Transformative Labour Law’ in J. Conaghan, M. Fischl, K. Klare Labour Law in 
an Era of Globalisation: Transformative Practices and Possibilities (Oxford: OUP, 2002) 3.  
112 H. Dagan and A. Dorfman, ‘Just Relationships’ (2016) 116 Columbia Law Review 1395, 1413. 
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jurisprudence, incorporates policy making (who should benefit from the legislation? What are 
the consequences of competing interpretations? etc) into traditional judicial action.113 
So how are we to decide between the legal policies present in the instant case? Arguably, 
recognising a contractual construction that deprives an employee of her status and hence – her 
access to statutory rights - is foreign to employment law (policy) as is a term that seeks to deny 
employment status simply through the incorporation of a term that states that ‘this is not an 
employment contract’.114 The EAT in Cave v Portsmouth rightly noted what should be obvious, 
i.e. that ‘the perception of the parties could not be decisive of the issue whether a contract 
existed. Indeed, I doubt whether it has any relevance at all to the question whether it is 
necessary to imply a contract in order to explain the way in which the relationships operate in 
practice’.115 
One may suggest, for example, a test for assessing whether a trilateral arrangement is 
perceived as ‘authentic’ or ‘fictitious’ (and, correspondingly, whether a contract should be 
implied) could be governed by the overriding principle – is it intended to circumvent collective 
agreements and thus undermine worker rights?116 In contrast, British courts found that ‘it is 
important to bear in mind that it is not against public policy for a contractor to obtain services 
in this way, even where the purpose is to avoid legal obligations which would otherwise arise 
were the workers directly employed’.117 One may wonder if a decision that a given act is ‘not 
against public policy’ is not a policy decision? And, more extensively, the court in Tilson noted 
that, according to prevalent judicial policy it is not 
legitimate for a tribunal to imply a contract because it objects to the practice 
of employers entering into arrangements of this kind in order to avoid 
incurring the obligations they owe to their employees. In many cases that is 
undoubtedly the reason why employers enter into agency arrangements.118  
                                                 
113 Autoclenz, n 49 above; McGaughey, n 7 above, 495; Davidov, n 50 above; G. Davidov, A Purposive 
Approach to Labour Law (OUP 2016) 
114 Ferguson v Dawson Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 1213, 1222; McGaughey, n 70 above. 
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Similarly, setting the bar high to satisfy the ‘sham’ criterion led the British courts to find that  
… there is nothing unlawful or wrongful in what Brooke Street as the 
employment agency and the council as the end user are evidently seeking to 
achieve for their own mutual advantage: that, if possible, Mrs Dacas works 
as a cleaner but not under a contract of service with either of them. They are 
entitled to arrange their affairs with that lawful aim in mind.119 
The council and the agency’s ‘affairs’ and ‘mutual advantage’ were clearly at the expense 
of Mrs Dacas, and to her disadvantage. The court reached a conclusion that is nothing but ‘legal 
policy’, namely: that depriving a worker of statutory rights is a ‘lawful aim’. Courts in other 
jurisdictions found such an arrangement to be ‘fictitious’, because it did not serve ‘authentic’ 
business ends, thus falling beyond the pale of a (legitimate) legal aim; in contrast, British courts 
chose not only not to find them unlawful, but also not ‘wrongful’.  
iv. Interim Summary 
What, therefore, were the options open before a court presented with an agency arrangement, 
and confronted with the hurdles of sham and necessity? First, it was free to reject any recourse 
to the two concepts at all. Indeed, a comparative perspective suggests noted that the British 
reference to the two concepts is unique, and is not paralleled in other countries. A contract of 
employment can be assumed to exist, as is done in Australia and on the continent, between the 
agency and the worker.120 Alternatively, the court could simply assert that an implied contract 
exists simply when it offers a better explanation of the reality, notwithstanding the existence 
of contracts that state otherwise.121 This approach often seeks to distinguish ‘authentic’ from 
‘fictitious’ contracts, with no regard to ‘necessity’ and ‘sham’ constraints.122 
                                                 
119 Dacas n 15 above at [51] 
120 M. Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (OUP 2003) 55; Nicola Contouris The Changing Law of the 
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employment’, see E. McGaughey ‘‘Uber, the Taylor Review, Mutuality, and the Duty to Not 
Misrepresent Employment Status’ (2019) 48 Industrial Law Journal 180, 189.  
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Second, it could make use of the necessity and sham concepts, but offer a radically different 
interpretation – one that is sensitive to the implications. As Freedland and Kountouris note, 
there ‘seems to be little or no perception … that the implication of a contract of employment 
might be judged to be ‘necessary’ in the very different sense that any other legal construction 
would deprive the worker of a legally protected status vis-à-vis the [hir]er’.123 In particular, 
one could suggest that the legal analysis should not be dismissive of the fact that ‘[t]he 
conclusion of the Employment Tribunal that Mrs Dacas was employed by nobody is simply 
not credible. There has to be something wrong with it’ and that such a result ‘defies common 
sense’.124 The path, after all, is already paved, and only needs following. We noted above that 
the court was satisfied, in a commercial context, with a test for implied terms that would ask 
what is ‘strictly necessary […] to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties’.125 
One would assume that, in an employment context, those reasonable would include, inter alia, 
the expectation of an agency worker that she has not been thrust into a legal vacuum, with no 
employer and thus deprived of any employment rights.  
As Lord Sumption observed, the impact of concepts such as rationality has spread beyond 
public law, and they now play ‘an increasingly significant role in the law relating to contractual 
discretions, where the law’s object is also to limit the decision-maker to some relevant 
contractual purpose’.126 It is thus for the court to decide if safeguarding workers’ rights and 
redressing inequality of bargaining power is such a ‘relevant contractual purpose’.  
With respect to sham, we saw that the Supreme Court in Autoclenz (and its precursors127) 
explained how and why this could be done. It would now only need to apply this approach to 
trilateral employment relations.128 As for ‘necessity’, the court could imbue it with content that 
takes into account the implications of the commercial interpretation, which posits an 
insurmountable bar for the vast majority of workers. Such a prescription would sit well with 
Legal Realists, who ‘insist that legal reasoning …. should be oriented toward the human end 
served by law [and] should not blind itself to … broader social ramifications’129 and supports 
                                                 
123 M. Freedland and N. Kountouris, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations (Oxford: OUP 2011) 
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‘the adjustment of principles and doctrines to the human condition they are to govern rather 
than first principles; for putting the human factor in the central place and relegating logic to its 
true position as an instrument’.130 We turn to this perspective now.  
2. Prescription 
One of the less noted differences between formalist, legal positivism, on the one hand, and 
Legal Realism, on the other hand, relates to the ‘the factual matrix’131 that needs to be taken 
into account when determining legal questions. In particular, students are taught, lawyers argue 
and judges routinely decide the law as they turn to past decisions – statutes passed by 
parliaments, regulations handed down by the administrative branch and, of course, precedents 
of relevance decided by courts in the past. Intriguingly, ‘mainstream’ labour law scholarship 
noted the shortcomings of this approach, suggesting that law has to consider ‘the social effect 
of the norm … the way in which it appears in society and … its social function’.132 
And yet, tribunals and courts seemingly accord little to no weight to the expected impact 
of the decisions – how they will affect the parties involved, let alone – those beyond. Moreover, 
as observed in the discussion of the Postscript in James, it is almost a sense of professional 
integrity that requires the court to treat future effects of the decision with a degree of benign 
neglect. To an extent, there is some overlap between this matter and the distinction between 
law and policy. One may suggest, thus, that ‘law’ is backwards looking; whereas ‘policy’ is 
forward looking.  
But if that is indeed the case, then the instant inquiry offers further impetus to the need to 
rethink this distinction. However, in contrast to the previous discussion, here the focus is 
somewhat different. Rather than suggesting whether courts should take into account certain 
principles that are often viewed as matters of ‘policy’, the emphasis here is that court decisions 
do not only resolve past disputes on the basis of norms promulgated in the past, but necessarily 
affect the behaviour of a wide range of actors in the future. This seems like a trivial insight and, 
indeed, one that is accepted by those far removed from the Legal Realist camp. Thus, Brian 
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Leiter speaks of law’s central function to provide ‘effective guidance’,133 building on the 
foundations laid by Joseph Raz134 and HLA Hart.135 Further, this thesis was developed by 
others, with particular emphasis on private law.136  
In contrast, Legal Realists, always the sceptics, are those who question the effectiveness of 
the law. Here they share an interesting commonality with labour law scholarship over the past 
century.137 Oliver Wendell Holmes famously posited that we should view the law from the 
point of view of ‘our friend the bad man … who cares only for the material consequences of 
his acts’.138 This ‘bad man’ is a construct who, Twining explains, is ‘amoral, rational and 
calculating’.139 This seems only to clarify the obvious, to wit – that the law is not always 
effective, and does not always guide behaviour in the way that was intended. The ‘bad man’ 
will thus take a calculated risk and, for example, deny her employees minimum wage if the 
expectancy of a severe penalty is sufficiently low. But in viewing the law from this point of 
view Holmes offers a very different perspective than that espoused by HLA Hart, for example. 
Hart posits that legal norms provide standards for behaviour and conduct for the subjects, who 
obey not only due to fear of sanctions, but also because they embrace the ‘internal point of 
view’, and accept the normativity of the legal system.140 Such an approach would seem foreign 
to Holmes’s ‘bad man’.  
As crucial as this gap is in the diametrically different take on the psychological evaluation 
of the citizenry, it misses a fundamental grey area, which is critical for present purposes, and 
is also instructive more generally. For the Hart/Holmes disagreement concerns itself with the 
extreme case of an individual who considers disobeying the law.141 While obviously an area of 
copious jurisprudential analysis,142 arguably it is far more common, and intellectually 
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challenging, to posit the case of an individual who seeks to circumvent the spirit of the law, 
whilst remaining true to its letter, a form of ‘creative compliance’.143 In other words, an 
individual who does not fully embrace the internal point of view, but is not as cynical as the 
caricature of the ‘bad man’; rather, he views law as a force to be ‘avoided, evaded or perhaps 
used for his own purposes’.144 This individual seeks not only to avoid sanctions, but also moral 
opprobrium, by maximising his advantage whilst staying within the law.  
One need only to refer to the multitude of examples in the corporate realm, in spheres 
ranging from privacy to tax evasion, in which a common response to charges of dubious 
practices is that the company has ‘done nothing illegal’.145 Leaving to one side the sad (and 
obviously misguided) conflation of legality and morality (and thus – the argument that if a 
practice is not illegal, it is necessarily not immoral146), the question is: should the courts take 
into account such consequences of their decisions and internalise them into their legal 
reasoning? To clarify, we are no longer concerned here with the narrow, immediate implication 
of the decision, e.g. to deny employment status, and therefore – employment rights, from 
marginalised workers. Rather, we focus on the broader way in which judicial decisions have a 
future impact. Law, after all, ‘affects people’s lives dramatically’147 well beyond the 
courtroom. Rather than viewing the law as reflecting from the present to an occurrence in the 
past, and governing its consequences, it is recognised that ‘law does not simply reflect social 
context, but also shapes it’.148 One may say that the court’s analysis has an ‘observer effect’ 
quality, in that the observation and analysis change the nature of the phenomenon being 
observed – accounting for ‘the actual social effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines’.149  
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For Realists, the consequences of this insight are straightforward. The Realist conception 
of law ‘is both backward looking and forward looking, constantly challenging the desirability 
of existing doctrines’ normative underpinnings, [and] their responsiveness to the social context 
in which they are situated’.150 In the current context, this ‘responsiveness to the social context’ 
is acutely necessary. This is because social-economic situations in general, and in the 
employment context in particular, are rarely constant. Rather, employers may, and indeed do, 
adapt or even manipulate their behaviour to satisfy the legal tests which courts set.151 
In the case at hand, we find a common thread that carries throughout the jurisprudence of 
employment relationship: the focus on the employer’s control over the worker’s activity, or 
even more broadly, her integration into the workplace: ‘the daily contact ... the nature and the 
extent of the dealings between them’.152 Jeremias Prassl suggests that ‘the objective fact and 
degree of control was suggested to be the crucial element in finding an implied contract of 
employment’.153 Even critics of the courts’ more progressive approach agree that ‘Questions 
of mutuality and control intertwine in many of the cases concerning multilateral 
relationships’.154 Indeed, the EAT in Motorola v. Davidson155 concluded that the worker, 
though contractually an employee of a third party, should be viewed as an employee of 
Motorola, relying solely on the latter’s control over the individual. Similarly, the CoA in Dacas 
stressed the presence of day to day control as a central and necessary condition to establish a 
contract between the end user (or agency) and the worker.156 
Against this background, we can now point to a guiding rationale that underlies the tests 
for the sham doctrine and the necessity requirement, which is thus crucial to the success of 
claim for employment status in the context of a trilateral relationship:  
The stronger the association of the employee to the end-user, beyond the realms of the 
contractual engagement, the stronger the tendency to treat the distancing contract as a sham 
or, alternatively, to imply a contract between the end-user and the worker. In contrast, the 
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greater the distance between the employee and the daily routine of the workplace, the more the 
court will be inclined to reject the claim for an implied contract.  
Taking a broader view, one may argue that if long term contractual relations ‘should aim 
at developing governance structures that sustain interdependence and are conducive to long-
term trust and solidarity’,157 then this jurisprudence induces precisely the opposite effect, by 
encouraging practices that exacerbate the distancing amongst workers and between employers 
and workers. For if a given end-user seeks to avoid the obligations associated with his 
responsibilities as employer, and becomes aware that courts will be assessing if an individual 
is treated ‘as though he were a wholly integrated member of staff’,158 one may assume that it 
will adapt accordingly by reducing the integration between itself and the workers. As we 
already witness, employers insist, for example, that the provider will operate from her own 
facility (perhaps even in another country), and that workers will refrain from wearing the 
company’s uniform so as to reduce the risk of reclassification.159 The practice of increased 
‘distancing’ - ‘the displacement of employment contracts by commercial contracts’160 – serves 
as a means to that end.  
Indeed, an exceptional indication of this mindset is evident in the Guidance given from the 
office of the Deputy Prime Minister, quoted in Woodhouse:161 
30.1 Neither Leeds North West Homes nor its personnel shall in any 
circumstances hold itself or themselves out as being the servant or agent of 
the Council otherwise then in circumstances expressly permitted by the 
agreement. 
This is a good place to note a crucial point, which unfortunately veers beyond the remit of 
this piece and thus cannot be fully explored here – that which concerns the identity of the end-
user. It is not coincidental that quite a few of the agency work cases discussed here – including 
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Dacas, James, Woodhouse, Pegg, and Cave – involve local authorities. While, in the past, those 
employed in a wide range of public services were generally employed directly by the (national 
or local) government, the Conservative government implemented the Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering programme in the 1980s, which changed the default position by requiring local 
authorities and other public bodies (with the NHS a prominent example162) to move from in-
house employment to contracting out.163 Part 2 of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 
1994 further facilitated contracting out by empowering ministers to transfer public functions 
to the private sector without the need for specific legislation. This ‘qualitative change’ has led 
scholars like Mark Freedland to express concern that, under the guise of a ‘little and 
mechanical’ reform, the British government managed to change central features of 
constitutional law through the seemingly innocuous policy of contracting out.164  
The consequences have become clear: some authorities source over 10 per cent, and up to 
20 per cent, of their staff from agencies.165 Returning to the Deputy Prime Minister’s Guidance 
quoted above, we find that the relevant ministry, or local authority, may extend the ‘arm’s 
length’, reduce control, minimise supervision, curtail government training and moderate daily 
contact with the workers providing public services, reacting to the looming threat of a judicial 
decision that will ascribe employer responsibility to the government authority.166  
One example for such a state of affairs became evident during a litigation in Israel brought 
by several secretaries who were employed, through a service provider, by the Revenue 
Service.167 Justice Rosenfeld described how, ‘prior to the claim brought by the plaintiffs, some 
of the secretaries who are plaintiffs in this case, sat in the same room as secretaries who are 
government employees. Immediately following the submission of the motion to the court, … 
six secretaries who are government employees were placed in the ‘small room’, while the 
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plaintiffs were moved to the ‘big room’”.168 Ten years later, the present author was approached 
by workers employed, through an agency, by the Department of Social Services in a major 
municipality. Upon hearing of the approach, the municipality’s legal counsel instructed the 
department not to allow agency workers to enter the department building, to use department 
computers or to participate in staff meetings. The municipality was clear as to the aim of this 
instruction: workers cannot be perceived as having obtained the relevant ties to support the 
claim that they are employed directly by the municipality. 
From the worker’s perspective, the fear that an employment contract would be implied, or 
that the existing contracts would be declared ‘sham’ (as they do not reflect the reality of the 
relationship) has led the employer to limit the worker’s integration, responsibilities and 
inclusion in the work environment. Familiar examples include denying agency workers access 
to facilities enjoyed by regular staff members, such as eating in the canteen, transportation to 
and from the workplace, use of staff showers, and so forth.169 
The implications on private and public services, and not only on workers’ rights, are thus 
far reaching. Legal Realists would suggest that courts should not ignore these implications, or 
the common sense trajectory that lead from their own decisions. 
Conclusion  
The jurisprudence concerning agency work offers fertile ground for Legal Realism: judges 
reaching significantly different conclusions whilst seeking to cover them with a veil of doctrine 
in a manner that would enrage the likes of Felix Cohen and Karl Llewellyn. But it is not only 
an academic exercise that concerns us here. Agency work, outsourcing, and sub-contracting 
are becoming increasingly popular, to the detriment of tens of thousands of workers in the UK.  
Notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, judges have discretion within the existing 
legal paradigm to shift the impetus of current tests; and the power to purge them altogether, in 
line with the doctrine in other jurisdictions. The predicament of agency workers outside the 
UK, it should be clarified, is far from ideal, and has been subject to extensive criticism as well; 
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and yet, it may be plausibly be seen as the result of social and economic forces that the courts 
are less competent to oppose. In the UK, in contrast, the courts’ jurisprudence has needlessly 
exacerbated the state of affairs. This is not a foregone conclusion. Instead, courts may show 
awareness to the ramifications of existing doctrine, consistently maintain that the commercial 
contract and the employment contract are different beasts, and offer a renewed evaluation of 
the legitimacy of contractual structures that seek nothing but the evasion of employment status 
and rights. They may recognise that the formalist account, which supposedly adheres to set 
doctrine, doesn’t actually do so. Instead, the decision to incorporate legal concepts from a 
commercial legal context to an employment one is a contested one, as is the particular 
interpretation given to particular terms (in this case, ‘necessity’ and ‘sham’). These are, in other 
words, decisions of legal policy, which can and should pay more than lip-service to the real, 
social and economic consequences that derive from them.  
Courts are aware that their decisions have an impact on individual’s behaviour. In fact, as 
is the case when they ‘send a message’ with strict sanctions (e.g. for welfare beneficiaries) and 
penalties (for criminal offenders), for example, courts sometimes have an inflated view of the 
impact of their decisions, and explicitly base their reasoning on such a view. It thus seems 
peculiar to expect the legal community and the public at large to accept that in the social and 
economic realm, for example, courts have done all they can, and the ensuing problems rest 
with the legislature to address. After all, the legislature did not impose the concepts of sham or 
necessity, let alone their particular and peculiar interpretations, on the courts, and thus it is not 
(necessarily) for the legislature to solve. A few brief insights into the approaches of other 
common law jurisdictions reveal that British jurisprudence in this area is not only harsh, but 
also exceptional. There are commonalities, however. Indeed, as the paper shows, both in 
Britain and elsewhere we find that problematic tests for employment status in the agency work 
context leads (particularly) public authorities to distance themselves from workers, in a manner 
that affects not only the workers themselves, but also the quality and integrity of the service. 
These reasons suggest that the time has now passed for a realist revision of agency work 
jurisprudence.  
